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Introduction 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today, it is a principle instrument in awakening the child to cul-
tural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him 
to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity 
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide 
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.2 
Although the Supreme Court in its 1954 historic decision focused on 
the elimination of racial segregation in the public schools, it did recognize 
a right to equal educational opportunities for all. It seems rational and 
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almost compelling to apply these words to retarded children since many 
of them may be "completely dependent on skills which only an education 
can provide." 3 As Herr (1972) states, "As opposed to ordinary children, 
the severely retarded are not likely to achieve, informally or environment-
ally, even a minimal amount of development. Absent education, the re-
tarded or handicapped citizen will be unable to function in society and 
may never develop the skills required even to care for himself. He is thus 
placed in jeopardy of institutionalization, loss of liberty, and even loss of 
life." 4 
In the United States today there are an estimated seven million chil-
dren who have mental, physical, emotional, or learning handicaps. How-
ever, only forty percent or 2,800,000 of these children are receiving an 
education.5 Many children are excluded or suspended from school, trans-
ferred, reassigned, inappropriately placed, or denied special help. Many 
others have been placed on waiting lists for special education classes and, 
thus, have had their education indefinitely "postponed." Exclusion from 
school has been based on many grounds: that a child is emotionally dis-
turbed, is mentally retarded or hyperactive, is a discipline problem, has 
some behavioral deficit (such as lacking language or not being toilet 
trained), or is unable to "pass" a standardized test.0 In addition, children 
in institutions often receive no (or minimal) education. If they have edu-
cational opportunities, these are often of poor quality. This all seems to 
add up to a denial of equal opportunity for education. Can this be done, 
and what recourse do these children and their parents or advocates have? 
T o begin to discuss answers to these questions, it is first necessary to con-
sider briefly some general constitutional and legal issues. Many of these 
issues have arisen in cases concerning the rights of institutionalized people 
to appropriate treatment and will be described within this context. Later, 
the relevance of these issues to the right to education will be explored. 
Constitutional and Legal Issues 
Due Process 
The 14th Amendment states "nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." 7 A prohibition 
is similarly placed on the federal government by the 5th Amendment 
which states that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law." 8 These due process provisions have 
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 27 
been interpreted to require that "fundamental fairness" be used by the 
government in any action affecting a person's liberty. For example, con-
cerning involuntary deprivation of liberty, the Supreme Court has stated: 
"At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of the 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed." 9 Thus, when a mentally retarded individual is 
involuntarily confined by a civil commitment which denies the full range 
of procedural safeguards made available to criminal defendants, and 
when this commitment can be for an indefinite term even though no 
criminal act has been committed, "fundamental fairness requires that 
treatment and not mere custody by the necessary quid pro quo for his 
loss of liberty." 10 This may be labeled as substantive due process which 
"requires government action to be reasonable in purpose, method, and 
impact." 11 The requirement for "reasonable" action on the part of the 
government may also apply in cases where mentally retarded people are 
excluded from public education on the basis of vague and unjustifiable 
criteria. 
Another kind of due process is procedural and requires that an indi-
vidual be allowed a hearing, be notified of this hearing, be represented 
by counsel, be given the opportunity to present evidence, and be able to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses.12 This principle may apply in cases 
of involuntary commitment to institutions, in exclusion from educational 
opportunity, in transfers from one educational situation to another, and 
in placement in special education classes. 
Equal Protection of the Laws 
The 14th Amendment also states ". . . nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 13 This prohibits unfair 
discrimination against, or classification of, any individual or group of in-
dividuals. In right to treatment cases, for example, this means that per-
sons can be classified as "mentally retarded," and subsequently deprived 
of their liberty, only if treatment is provided. If people are classified as 
mentally retarded and deprived of their freedom with no treatment, then 
unfair discrimination and a denial of equal protection has taken place 
because "they alone are picked out for 'preventive detention* while all 
other dangerous people who have not actually committed criminal acts 
are allowed to remain free." 14 In addition, this can be applied to treat-
ment received in one facility as compared to another: physical and finan-
cial resources and the personnel must be equal for the two. 
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The equal protection provision has also been used in right to educa-
tion cases. If the government undertakes to provide education at all, it 
must do so for everyone. It cannot discriminate against a mentally re-
tarded individual unless there is a compelling state interest to do so. A 
"compelling state interest" requires a much stricter reason for action and 
must be distinguished from the usual requirement that a statute only be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. 
"Least Restrictive Environment" Principle 
This principle is based upon the premise that people should be free to 
live as they please unless they are harming others. T h e principle declares 
that when the government does have a legitimate goal to accomplish, it 
should do this by means that curtail individual freedom to the least ex-
tent possible while still securing the goal.15 The Supreme Court of the 
United States has made the following statement concerning judgment of 
governmental actions: "Even though the governmental purpose be legiti-
mate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that 
broadly stifle personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the 
light of less drastic means of achieving the same basic purpose." 16 
There are several conditions where the principle of the "least restrictive 
alternative" may be applied. One is where the legislation establishing 
treatment or educational programs specifically outlines alternative meth-
ods, or leaves the court discretion in employing alternative methods.17 
For example, if legislation establishing treatment programs for the men-
tally ill allows the court discretion in assigning a treatment program, the 
principle of the "least restrictive alternative" may suggest that a mentally 
ill person be treated at a local mental health clinic versus institutional-
izing the person. Their rationale for using this principle is that commit-
ment "entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty" and that "such a 
drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudg-
ingly, construed in order to avoid deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law." 18 Similarly, the "least restrictive alternative" principle 
may apply in educational placement cases. 
If legislation (statutes) does not specify that alteratives may be used, 
the Constitution may offer the necessary force. T h e United States Su-
preme Court and State Supreme Courts have ruled on several occasions,19 
that state governments are compelled "to achieve clearly legitimate goals 
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by schemes of regulation less constrictive of some important constitution-
ally protected interest than the scheme it was then using." 20 The critical 
issue here is that to insist upon the court using the least restrictive alter-
native, the interest being affected by the state must be either: 1) a funda-
mental right or interest especially sensitive under the constitution (e.g., 
free speech) or 2) directed at groups discriminated against, where the 
criteria for grouping are regarded with special suspicion by the court (a 
suspect classification, e.g., race) . Traditionally, three factors have been 
used to qualify a group as being a "suspect class": 1) an immutable or 
unalterable trait or disability over which the individual has no control, 
2) a history of purposeful discrimination, and 3) a position of political 
powerlessness thus needing special judicial protection.21 
If the interest being affected is not a fundamental right or directed at a 
group with suspect classification, and if the statutes do not outline alter-
native methods or allow the court discretion in accomplishing certain 
goals, then the state does not have to present as strict an argument for 
its actions and the principle of the "least restrictive alternative" might 
not be applied. 
Legal Tests in Litigation 
There are three types of tests which may be applied by the courts in 
litigation. 
1. Strict Scrutiny. This is the strictest of the three tests. If the interest 
being affected is a fundamental right or directed at a group with 
suspect criteria, then the court applies this test. The defendant must 
show a "compelling interest" in his actions for the court to rule in 
favor of him. 
The next two tests are used when the interest being affected is not a 
fundamental right or is not directed at a group with suspect criteria. 
These tests require a less strict standard of reason for action by the de-
fendant. They are: 
2. Means-Focused Test. This requires that the defendant show a care-
ful consideration of the rationality of the action (e.g., legislation) 
to its purposes. 
3. Rational Basis Test. This requires that the defendant show that the 
exclusion or discrimination of a group (e.g., the mentally retarded) 
serves a legitimate purpose.22 
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Issues in the Right to Education for the Retarded 
Over the years many retarded children have been systematically ex-
cluded from appropriate educational opportunities. Is this legally justi-
fiable? To answer this, the following questions will be considered: 
Is education a fundamental light for all children, including the re-
tarded? 
Is exclusion of the retarded from schools a violation of equal protec-
tion of the laws? 
Do retarded children have a right to due process before exclusion from 
the schools or placement in a special classroom? 
Are retarded children entitled to an "appropriate" education? 
Are there any procedural safeguards against the use of I.Q. tests, label-
ing and thus, the educational placement of retarded children? 
Do retarded children in an institution have a right to education? 
Can the principle of the "least restrictive means" be applied to educa-
tion for retarded children? 
What research has been done in the area of education for the retarded 
and how does it apply to the issues listed above? 
Is Education a Fundamental Right for All Children, Including the Re-
tarded? 
A fundamental right is one that is guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution or the relevant state constitution. If a fundamental right is 
being affected, then the court presumably should apply a strict scrutiny 
test in arriving at a decision. Many state and lower federal courts and 
lawyers have "treated education as a fundamental interest requiring a 
strict scrutiny test," 28 although none has claimed a federal constitutional 
right to education per se.2i A recent Supreme Court case (San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriquez,25 hereinafter referred to as 
"Rodriquez"), rejected the developing theory of education as a funda-
mental right and decided that education was not a fundamental right 
included "among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Fed-
eral Constitution." 20 
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A state, however, through its constitution and laws, may guarantee 
education to all children. For example, the Kansas Constitution does pro-
vide for education.27 In addition, special education is also provided for 
in a recently passed Kansas law.28 This special education is to be provided 
for "exceptional children" who are defined as: 
. . . persons who: (1) are school age, to be determined in accordance 
with rules and regulations which shall be adopted by the State Board 
and said school age may differ from the ages of children required to 
attend school under the provisions of K.S.A. 72-1 111; and (2) differ in 
physical, mental, social, emotional or educational characteristics to the 
extent that special education services are necessary to enable them to 
progress toward the maximum of their abilities or capacities.29 
The new bill states that: 
The board of education of every school district shall provide special 
education services for all exceptional children in the school district 
and said special education services shall me standards and criterion set 
by the State Board.30 
It, therefore, appears that as mandated by law all mentally retarded 
children in Kansas are to be provided with some type of special education. 
However, there are exceptions made in certain cases: 
No school district shall be required to keep an exceptional child in 
regular instruction when the child cannot materially benefit from the 
work of the regular classroom, nor to provide such exceptional child 
with special education services for exceptional children when it is deter-
mined that the child can no longer materially benefit therefrom, or 
needs more specialized instruction.31 
It should be noted that a child cannot be transferred to or from, or 
denied placement in special education services without first being 
afforded the right to a hearing.32 
Thus, even though the Supreme Court has ruled that education is not 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, a 
particular state constitution may guarantee this right to its residents. In 
states where the state constitution and laws do provide for education, and 
more specifically, for special education, each retarded child in that state 
may demand that education be provided as a right guaranteed by law. 
32 BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
Is Exclusion of the Retarded from Schools a Violation of Equal 
Protection of the Laws? 
1. Tests in litigation. Can a child who is capable of benefiting from 
any education be denied a public education? T o answer this question 
under the equal protection clause, the appropriate standard for review 
must be determined. The three standards previously described are: the 
strict scrutiny standard, the means-focused approach, and the rational 
basis test.33 
In order to use the strict scrutiny standard in this case, education must 
be a fundamental right or the mentally retarded must be considered a 
suspect class. Since Rodriquez ruled that education is not a fundamental 
right, this test can be used only if the mentally retarded are a suspect 
class. According to Richards and Williams, the mentally retarded do 
qualify as a suspect class because they meet the three necessary factors 
previously mentioned: (1) mental retardation is a disability over which 
the individual has no control; (2) the mentally retarded have a history 
of purposeful discrimination; and (3) the mentally retarded are in a 
position of political powerlessness. Thus, the mentally retarded seem to 
qualify as a suspect class, and a defendant (e.g., a school district) must 
show a compelling interest in order to exclude any mentally retarded 
person from public education.34 
If a court, for some reason, did not use the strict scrutiny test, a means-
focused or rationale basis test could be applied. Both are concerned with 
the purpose and the action as it relates to the purpose. For example, the 
purpose of the Kansas educational system is to educate its citizens, i.e., 
"the legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational, 
and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public 
schools . . 35 The question, then, is whether any action of excluding 
the mentally retarded is rationally related to Kansas' purpose of educat-
ing its citizens. It is estimated that 90%-95% of the people labeled as 
retarded could become partially or totally self-supporting.38 Since they 
are educable and could benefit from an education,37 excluding the men-
tally retarded seems wholly "arbitrary and irrational." 38 
A state or school district may argue that there are not enough financial 
resources to educate the mentally retarded. However, to make this argu-
ment, they must show that not educating the retarded is less expensive 
than educating them. Wolfensburger (1969) estimated that with increas-
ing institutional costs and increasing life spans, it may cost the public 
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 3 3 
between $100,000 and $350,000 (over a lifetime of a child) to institution-
alize a child.39 However, it should be noted that only a small proportion 
of retarded people are actually institutionalized. Even so, a large number 
of non-institutionalized, retarded people are cared for by the state in such 
community facilities as nursing homes, foster homes, boarding or group 
homes. Many other retarded people live at home and are cared for by 
their families. As will be discussed later, these people have the right to 
treatment equivalent to that given in an institution, although few receive 
it. Thus, the potential costs for treating retarded people living with their 
families may approximate the costs of institutionalizing them. 
Considering all three tests, then, equal protection under the law "re-
quires at the very least that all children be given access to the state system 
of public education/ ' 4 0 
2. Case law supporting equal protection. There are two landmark 
cases in the area of right to educate: Pennsylvania Association for Re-
tarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (PARC), and Mills 
v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia. 
T h e PARC case was decided on October 7, 1971. A three-judge federal 
court, following a consent agreement by the parties, ordered that all men-
tally retarded children in Pennsylvania "be given access to a free public 
program of education appropriate to their learning capacities." 41 The 
plaintiffs in this class action were the Pennsylvania Association for Re-
tarded Children, fourteen named retarded children who were denied an 
appropriate education in Pennsylvania, and all other children similarly 
situated. T h e defendants were the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 
Secretary of the Department of Education, the State Board of Education, 
the Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare, certain other school 
districts, their employees, officers, agents, and successors/2 
T h e Mills case was a class action suit. T h e plaintiffs were school-age 
children, who were residents of the District of Columbia, and "who had 
been denied placement in a publicly-supported educational program for 
substantial periods of time" 43 because of "alleged mental, behavioral, 
physical, or emotional handicaps or deficiencies." 44 The plaintiffs sued 
on behalf of all children who were or would be similarly situated in the 
District of Columbia. They asked the court "to declare their rights and to 
stop defendants from excluding them from the District of Columbia 
Public Schools and/or denying them publicly supported education and 
from failing to provide them with immediate and adequate education 
and educational facilities in the public schools or alternate placement 
at public expense, and also to give them additional relief to help effect-
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uate the primary relief." 46 T h e defendants were the Board of Education 
and its members, the mayor of Washington, D. C., the director of the 
Social Security Administration, and various administrators of the Wash-
ington, D. C. School System. The defendants acknowledged that they had 
a legal duty to provide education for all capable of benefiting from it in 
the District of Columbia; however, they stated that they lacked the neces-
sary financial resources to do so. 
Both the PARC and Mills cases found that total exclusion of handi-
capped children violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments. T h e plaintiffs in both of these cases argued that 
a "strict scrutiny" test be used on the basis that education was a "funda-
mental interest" (this can no longer be used in cases because of the Su-
preme Court ruling in the Rodriquez case) and that handicapped chil-
dren were classified using suspect criteria. The judges in the PARC case 
found that a denial of education violated the rational means test. The 
Mills case does not state what standard of review was used for its deci-
sion.4® (It still may be argued that a strict scrutiny test could be used in 
either case because of the "suspect" category.) In the PARC case the 
courts went further in stating in its order that "all mentally retarded 
persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and train-
ing . . ." 47 Thus, even the severely and profoundly retarded should be 
provided an education.48 This has implications for state statutes that 
allow some children to be excluded from public education. Following 
the PARC ruling, these statutory provisions would be in violation of the 
equal protection clause. 
Judge Waddy in the Mills case held that having insufficient funds does 
not excuse the defendants' duty to provide an education for the handi-
capped children. He made the following statement: 
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and 
programs that are needed in the system then the available funds must 
be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely ex-
cluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs 
and ability to benefit therefrom.49 
Thus, both the Mills and PARC landmark cases support the theory 
that all retarded children should receive an education under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Several other 
cases relying on the equal protection clause are now pending in the 
courts.50 
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Do Retarded Children Have a Right to Due Process Before Exclusion 
from the Schools or Placement in a Special Classroom? 
1. Procedural due process. "Exclusionary practices may also be at-
tacked as violative of procedural due process when no hearing is held 
before exclusion, regardless of the legality of the ground for exclusion." 51 
In both the PARC and Mills case ( and several others) ,62 the court ordered 
that due process requirements be fulfilled before any child be excluded 
or terminated from a program. These due process requirements include: 
a hearing, written notice of the hearing, counsel, opportunity to examine 
the child's school or medical records, opportunity to present evidence and 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, a right to independent medical, 
psychological, and educational evaluation of the child's capabilities, the 
right to a transcribed record of the hearing. Several cases considering this 
issue with the mentally retarded are pending in the courts.58 
2. Substantive due process. Regardless of the legality of the grounds 
for exclusion, exclusionary practices may be attacked as violative of sub-
stantive due process on the grounds that the criteria for exclusion in 
school laws, regulations, or policies are unduly vague or arbitrary, and 
unrelated to any legitimate reason for exclusion.84 For example, the re-
quirement that a child must be "ambulatory" or "toilet trained" might 
be unrelated to his ability to learn. The criteria used for exclusion must 
be written down, published, and made available to the parents.55 Simi-
larly, in cases where only a limited number of children can be taken in a 
program, written standards and a fair procedure must be used for selec-
tion.56 
Thus, it appear that no matter what a particular state statute reads, a 
parent has the right to insist that due process requirements be fulfilled be-
fore any child be excluded or terminated from a program. In addition, 
parents must be given specific written standards that tell what criteria are 
used for exclusion. Nonetheless, if a child is excluded (independent of 
how specific the criteria), he or she is entitled to procedural due process 
hich includes a hearing. 
Are Retarded Children Entitled to an "Appropriate" Education? 
The Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Board of Education that a 
child had a right to "equal educational opportunity." However, the court 
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neglected to specify what was required in order to meet "equal educa-
tional opportunity." Rodriquez requires that at least an adequate mini-
mum be provided for each child in every school district.57 The court in 
PARC required that every retarded person between the ages of six and 
twenty-one be given "access to a free public program of education and 
training appropriate to his learning capacities." 58 In the Mills case the 
court ordered that plaintiffs be provided "with a publicly supported 
education suited to their plaintiffs' needs . . 59 It seems evident that 
the courts believe that children must be provided an equal education 
opportunity that is appropriate to their needs. Just providing special 
education for a child is not enough; the education must be appropriate 
to a child's capabilities and needs. 
The issue then becomes how one defines "appropriate." Richards and 
Williams suggest that equal and appropriate education would provide 
the means to enable each child to learn as much as he is able according 
to the "widely varying capabilities . . of each child. However, they 
admit that exactly what a state must provide for each child is yet undeter-
mined.60 
Although the exact specifications of an "appropriate" education have 
yet to be made, parents of retarded children have a right to a due process 
advisory hearing before a child is initially placed in a particular classroom, 
before he is denied placement, or transferred from one classroom or pro-
gram to another.61 This can also provide the child and his parents the 
opportunity to have an input into the decision as to what type of educa-
tional program is appropriate to the child's individual needs. Due process 
requires that a school defend its placement of a child in terms of the 
appropriateness of the program.62 
An article by Weintraub and Abeson (1972) cites an interesting pro-
posal by Gallagher,68 that would increase the accountability of public 
education. Gallagher suggests that placement procedures require a formal 
contract between the school and parents. The contract would specify the 
following: "obligations of all parties, the educational objectives to be 
achieved, criteria for assessing their achievement, a timetable for evalua-
tion, and procedures for renegotiating the contract." 64 Under this pro-
posal, then, schools would have to demonstrate some type of behavioral 
change (e.g., reading skills learned or improved) instead of merely pro-
viding a program. When public schools cannot demonstrate that they are 
teaching a retarded child (i.e., in terms of behavioral skills learned), the 
courts have held that the public school is responsible for paying tuition 
to a private school where the child does make progress in learning.65 
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Thus, while the courts have ruled that children should receive an edu-
cation appropriate to their needs, "appropriate" has yet to be defined. 
Perhaps one way of defining an "appropriate" education for each child 
is to specify what skills and behaviors a child needs to learn. If the educa-
tion teaches these specific skills and behaviors, then it can be called 
"appropriate." 
Are There any Procedural Safeguards Against the Use of I.Q. Tests, 
Labeling, and Thus, the Educational Placement of Retarded Childrenf 
Often children have been given I.Q. tests and then placed in "appro-
priate" classrooms. Garrison and Hammill (1971) state that "when the 
I.Q. is used as the single criterion for identification, gross errors in place-
ment are possible." 96 For many children I.Q. tests may not accurately 
reflect their learning ability. Ross, DeYoung, and Cohen (1971) suggest 
three reasons why: (1) I.Q. tests are generally standardized on the per-
formance of white, middle-class students; (2) they are heavily verbal; and 
(3) they contain questions that are more easily answered by white, 
middle-class students. Thus, these tests may "discriminate against chil-
dren of racial and cultural minorities and are therefore in violation of 
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment . . 67 
Because of the above reasons, several successful suits have challenged 
the use of testing instruments (e.g., I.Q. tests) to place children in special 
education classes Diana v. State Board of Education68 involved Spanish 
speaking children who claimed they had been improperly placed in classes 
for the retarded on the basis of inaccurate tests. A consent decree was 
agreed upon which required that non-English speaking children be tested 
in both their primary language and in English and that the tests must 
not depend on such things as vocabulary, general information, or any 
other unfair verbal question. Further, it was specified in the consent de-
cree that all Chinese and Mexican-American children in classes for the 
retarded were to be retested. A similar consent decree was obtained in 
Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe Elementary School District.69 
In another landmark case, Hobson v. Hansen,70 the court ruled that the 
"tracking" system of educational placement used in Washington, D. C. 
public schools was illegal. The plaintiffs used the aforementioned argu-
ment that the testing procedures used for placement were prejudicial. On 
the basis of these test scores, children were placed in honors, general, or 
special (educable mentally retarded) curriculum classes. The judge 
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found that there were disproportionate numbers of black children in the 
special classes and attributed this to cultural bias of the test. In addition, 
there were infrequent retests, so a student could easily become locked into 
a certain track The court, using the equal protection clause, held that the 
tracking system and its testing procedures "irrationally separated students 
on the basis of race and socioeconomic background and thereby violated 
their right to an equal educational opportunity." 71 
The court reached a similar decision in Larry v. Riles72 stating that I.Q. 
tests were "suspect" and the school must show a rational relationship be-
tween the testing apparatus and the ability to learn. When the children in 
this case were retested by personnel who rephrased the questions, the 
plaintiffs were not classified as retarded. The fact that a disproportionate 
number of children of a particular race are in special classes does not 
necessarily establish lack of equal protection, but this does put a burden 
on the state to show that the tests used for placement are not discrimina-
tory.78 Using these same arguments about I.Q. tests and subsequent plac-
ing, suits have been brought against school districts seeking money dam-
ages as a remedy against unfair placement practices.74 
An issue related to placement of retarded children is that of classifying 
the handicapped by labels, such as "trainable mentally retarded." Several 
authors in the field feel such labeling can cause serious problems. Wein-
traub and Abeson75 feel that such labels may produce four major prob-
lems: 
1. Children classified as educable or trainable mentally retarded 
may become the victims of significant stigma. T h e PARC court spoke 
on this issue: 
Experts agree that it is primarily the school which imposes the men-
tally retarded label and concomitant stigmatization upon children 
either initially or later on through a change in educational assign-
ment.76 
2. Once a child is assigned a label, those who work with him often 
have stereotyped expectations of his behavior. This is often referred 
to as the "self-fulfilling prophecy." Kenneth Clark expresses this in a 
good example: 
If a child scores low on an intelligence test because he cannot read 
and then is not taught to read because he has a low test score, then 
such a child is being imprisoned in an iron circle and becomes the 
victim of an educational self-fulfilling prophecy.77 
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3. Public and private agencies which offer special services often 
determine the population they will serve on the basis of a pre-assigned 
label. 
4. Children with labels, such as "mentally retarded" or "handi-
capped," may be placed in a special education program independent of 
whether or not it is needed. This gets back to the use of having a label 
placed on a child because of the results of an I.Q. test. 
The Supreme Court ruled under the due process clause in a Wisconsin 
case7" that a hearing must be provided before a label or stigma can be pub-
licly given to a person. In educational litigation the argument could be 
used that labeling a person "mentally retarded" in the school system is a 
public stigma and must require a notice before it can be done. However, 
past educational litigation has set a much stronger precedent for arguing 
against the use of I.Q. tests as the sole criterion for the educational place-
ment of a child, especially if the test is not administered in his native 
language. Some states (e.g., Kansas) will be requiring a hearing before a 
child can be placed in a special education class. At this hearing, school 
personnel will need to specify the reasons for placement of a child. This 
provides a protection against the use of vague or unfair criteria (e.g., I.Q. 
tests) for school placement. 
Do Retarded Children in an Institution Have a Right to Education? 
Thus far we have been talking about the right to education for chil-
dren who live in the community. What about children who reside in 
institutions? Many state statutes provide for the education of children 
who reside in institutions. An example is one of the Kansas statutes which 
states the objective of one of the state institutions for the mentally re-
tarded. 
The object of Parsons State Hospital and Training Center shall be to 
examine, treat, educate, train, and rehabilitate the persons admitted 
and retained so as to make such persons more comfortable, happy, and 
better fitted to care for and support themselves. T o this end, the secre-
tary shall provide such examination, treatment, education (including 
academic and vocational), training and rehabilitation facilities as he 
shall deem necessary and advisable.79 
The objective of other Kansas institutions for the mentally retarded are 
similar. Thus, relying on state statutes, one may find a guarantee for the 
right to education for children residing in institutions. 
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Courts have also ruled that children in institutions have a right to edu-
cation. In Wyatt v. Stickney a recent right-to-treatment case involving 
three Alabama institutions (including Partlow, an institution for the 
mentally retarded), the court ruled that: 
Residents shall have a right to receive suitable educational services 
regardless of chronological age, degree of retardation or accompanying 
disabilities or handicaps . . . School age residents shall be provided 
with a full and suitable educational program and such programs shall 
meet prescribed minimal standards.80 
These standards were:81 
Severe/ 
Mild Moderate Profound 
1. Class Size 12 9 6 
2. Length of school 
year in months 9-10 9-10 11-12 
3. Minimum length of 
school day in hours 6 6 6 
Although these standards are a step in the right direction, they do not 
specify that any behavioral change (i.e., skill learned or improved) take 
place. We have the same problem here as wras discussed before in public 
education. 
If a state, through its statutes, provides for education of children in 
institutions, the questions arise of which residents in the institution 
should be in educational programs and what standards should be set for 
education in these institutions? Relying on the ruling in Wyatt, all chil-
dren, regardless of their degree of retardation, should be receiving an 
education. Again equal protection of the law could be used as an argu-
ment for this. 
Concerning the standards set for education, if it could be shown that 
the institutions were not educating the residents (in other words, few 
people were learning new skills or ones which would allow them to better 
care for themselves), then one could argue that the institution should 
provide programs that do teach these skills or the children should be 
placed (and, thus, funds appropriated) in programs or facilities that do 
accomplish these goals. Also, if educational facilities in an institution are 
inferior to those in the community, a denial of equal protection could be 
argued. 
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Can the Principle of the "Least Restrictive Means" Be Applied to 
Education for Retarded Children? 
In cases where the courts have recognized the right to education for all 
children, some have also ordered that the least restrictive program of 
education be used. The court, in the PARC case, ordered that: 
among the alternative programs of education and training required by 
statute to be available, placement in a regular public school class is 
preferable to placement in a special public school class, and placement 
in a special public school class is preferable to placement in any other 
type of program of education.82 
The court in the Wyatt case, when speaking of habilitation, also spoke of 
the least restrictive alternative. Habilitation, as defined by the court, 
refers to "programs of formal, structural education and treatment." 88 
The court stated: "Residents shall have a right to the least restrictive con-
ditions necessary to achieve the purposes of habilitation." 84 It therefore 
appears that the state must show at least a rational reason why a child 
should be educated in an institution as opposed to a special class in a 
public school as opposed to a regular classroom. 
One approach that has been taken in order to provide the most "appro-
priate" and the "least restrictive" type of education is that of the "Cascade 
System" shown below.85 
Number of Children 
Regular Classroom 
I. Regular classroom with specialist consultation 
II . Regular classroom with itinerant teachers 
I I I . Regular classroom plus a resource room 
Part Time Special Class 
Full Time Special Class 
Special Day School 
Residential School 
Hospital 
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This continuum of educational service model allows a child to be placed 
in the setting appropriate to his needs. The critical feature of this model, 
though, is that it allows a child to move in order to have "the maximum" 
opportunity to obtain and participate in a normal educational experi-
ence." 86 
Another interesting idea is that of providing a financial incentive for 
local school districts to serve all mentally retarded children (instead of 
relying on segregated alternatives) and mainstreaming them (i.e., getting 
them back into regular classes) .87 This might be done in the following 
way: first, financial incentives could be given to a school district for taking 
a child from an institution and placing him in some type of program in 
the public schools. Incentives could also be given to a school district for 
taking emotionally disturbed, behavior problem children, and the men-
tally retarded from the community and placing them in programs in the 
public schools. Some states do allow for additional state monies to be 
given to a school district for special classes or special teachers to assist 
children in the regular classroom. In addition, all state assistance (includ-
ing that for "normal" children) could be made contingent on the school 
district providing services for every child. This incentive procedure might 
initially be used just to get children back into the public schools, but we 
must be careful that our incentive program does not just reinforce the 
establishment of special classes and, thus, segregation of the mentally 
handicapped. Therefore, incentives (e.g., time off or extra pay) should be 
provided for teachers who are willing to take these emotionally disturbed, 
behavior problem, or mentally retarded children back into the regular 
classroom for at least a short period of time (i.e., a couple of hours a 
day), and eventually for the entire school day. 
Finally, incentives could be provided for teachers who show the devel-
opment of important skills in the children they teach. This is important 
for all children in school, but is especially crucial for the mentally re-
tarded. Often they need much more input than a normal child needs in 
order to learn a specific skill, whether it be tying his or her shoes or learn-
ing to read. Too often, educational programs exist for the mentally re-
tarded that merely try to "make them happy." Although this is important, 
it is also important to teach them. One might argue that this is essentially 
what teachers are paid to do and, therefore, they should not receive any-
thing extra (even extra time off) for doing it. Even though this is what 
teachers are supposed to do, the fact remains that often it does not hap-
pen; often retarded children stay in the same class for years without pro-
gressing in terms of learning new skills. T o get teachers "to teach," a 
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minimal base pay could be given to the teacher upon being hired. Incre-
ments in the pay level could be contracted for by the teacher demon-
strating behavioral changes in his or her children. 
What Research Has Done in the Area of Education for the Retarded 
and How Does it Apply to the Issues Listed Above? 
Abeson (1972) reports that research findings have indicated that early 
childhood education is essential for all children, especially the handi-
capped. Thus, he recommends that states lower their minimum entrance 
age of school to birth.88 Likewise, he feels that since many handicapped 
youths may need prolonged education in order to successfully adapt to 
the "normal" world, states should extend the maximum age limit to 21 
years or higher.89 
Cegelka and Tyler (1970) wrote an excellent review article on whether 
educable mentally retarded children should receive their education in a 
special or regular classroom.90 They first discussed studies which looked 
at academic performance. Most of the studies matched children in a spe-
cial class with children in a regular class on the dimensions of CA, IQ, 
and sex. The most sophisticated studies also matched the subjects on such 
dimensions as socioeconomic community ratings, history of school atten-
dance, foreign language spoken in the home, and reading achievement. 
The results were split between the studies: some showed that there were 
no differences in academic performance, as measured by achievement tests, 
between children placed in a special education class as opposed to com-
parable children placed in a regular class; the other results demonstrated 
that children placed in regular classes had higher performance on achieve-
ment tests than did children placed in special education classes. Few 
studies demonstrated higher performance achieved by children left in a 
special classroom. 
Cegelka and Tyler also reviewed the research data on the social and 
emotional adjustment of educable mentally retarded children placed in 
special classes as opposed to regular classes. Results again seemed to be 
ambiguous. Some studies reported that special class placement led to 
poorer self-concept among these children, while others reported the oppo-
site. Cegelka and Tyler concluded that much more research needs to be 
done in this area. 
Postschool adjustment of the educable mentally retarded has also been 
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researched. Two widely quoted studies were also reviewed by Cegelka and 
Tyler. One found that the only difference between postschool adjustment 
of students from special as opposed to regular classes was that employer 
ratings were more favorable for the special class groups as versus those 
for the regular class.91 The other study also indicated an advantage for 
persons who had atteended a special class during their school years. The 
important difference in this study seemed to be in the greater frequency 
of employment of the persons in the special class group.92 
The lack of consistent differences between children in special and regu-
lar classes is difficult to interpret. On one hand it it possible that many 
children are initially misplaced in special classes, thus accounting for the 
lack of differences on test and other performance measures. Such a con-
clusion is suggested by the results of a study by Garrison and Hammill.93 
On the other hand, it is possible that special classes take children with 
behavioral and intellectual deficits and make them approximate other 
"normal" children with the same C.A. and I.Q. Cegelka and Tyler suggest 
some controls and changes that might be used in future studies of this 
type. Content taught in classes should be controlled for, since achieve-
ment tests may be measuring what is taught in a regular class but not in 
a special class. In addition, the teaching procedures and curricular should 
be controlled. Because students are equal in I.Q., one cannot assume that 
they are equal in other characteristics; these should be controlled for. 
Often children are assigned to special education classes not merely on the 
basis of test scores, but also because of various behavioral characteristics: 
they are disruptive and aggressive in class, hyperactive, and lack instruc-
tional control. T o the extent that these behaviors do differentiate between 
children assigned to regular and special education classes, and to the 
extent that they are predictive of future difficulties in school and in 
other situations, comparisons based on the outcomes of children matched 
only on test scores may be inappropriate. What seems to be needed is a 
study which probably will never be done: random assignment of children 
with equivalent learning and behavioral deficits and excesses to regular 
and special education classes to see if there are differential outcomes. 
Nonetheless, the past research seems to have important implications. 
At the present time, there seems to be no conclusive evidence that chil-
dren assigned to special education classes benefit more or less than 
children assigned to regular classes. If retarded children can be educated 
as well in regular classrooms, it seems economically more efficient to do 
so. Also, it would seem preferred in terms of the "least restrictive" method 
and in reducing labels attached by special classrooms. 
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Conclusion 
Although the courts have not regarded education as a fundamental 
right afforded explicit protection under the United States Constitution, 
many states, through their constitutions and laws, have guaranteed edu-
cation to all children. In these states, retarded children can demand that 
education be provided to them as a right and that the educational oppor-
tunities provided be ones which benefit them and be appropriate to their 
needs. Before children are placed in special classrooms, they have the right 
to both procedural and substantive due process which involves, among 
other things, the opportunity for a hearing, the opportunity to present 
evidence and the examination of the criteria for placement in the special 
classroom. These rights apply equally for retarded children living in the 
community as well as those residing in institutions. Further, the "least 
restrictive alternative" applies. This implies that the educational goals 
should be accomplished in a way which limits an individual's freedom 
and liberty the least. In practice, this may mean an increasing em-
phasis on the use of educational programs in the community where a re-
tarded person lives rather than in institutions. Finally, the right to educa-
tion implies that criteria exist for evaluating whether education is 
effective and adequate. It is proposed that the effectiveness of education 
in producing specified desirable behavioral changes be one of the primary 
criteria used in an evaluation. 
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